A. Revelation may be natural or supernatural, either in form or in substance.
By revelation in general we understand any kind of manifestation; by divine revelation – a manifestation made by God. The subject, or substance, of divine revelation may be anything which can be brought to the knowledge of man.
I. Revelation may be divided, first, according to its form, i.e., according to the manner in which it is communicated, into natural and supernatural.
(a) Revelation is natural in form when it is communicated through nature, i.e., through the visible creation. From the created universe we infer the existence of the Creator, as well as His power, wisdom, and goodness. From conscience, which approves some actions as good, and condemns others as evil; which restrains us from the latter, and urges us on to the former; which rebukes us for evil, and commends us for good – we infer the existence of a divine law-giver, judge, and avenger.
What reason thus teaches regarding God is matter of knowledge, i.e., of conviction founded upon intrinsic reasons, not matter of faith, i.e., assent on external authority.
(b) Revelation is supernatural in form when it is communicated, not through nature or creation, but in a higher, supernatural manner; that is, when God speaks to us, either of Himself or through His messengers. In the first case this supernatural revelation is direct; in the second, indirect. Thus God spoke to the prophets directly, to the Jewish people indirectly through the prophets. If man can manifest to man his thoughts and desires by words or other signs, God can, in like manner, converse with His rational creatures, and communicate to them truths, facts, and precepts.
A manifestation which is supernatural, at least in form, is called simply a revelation, or a divine revelation, and all that is thus communicated, though it may have no special bearing on God, is therefore called divine truth. Divine truth thus communicated is matter of faith, i.e., to be accepted on the authority of God; for, to believe is to assent to another’s statement upon his authority, and not on account of the knowledge of the thing itself; or to hold a statement as true because another has uttered it. To believe God, therefore, means to accept a truth upon the authority of God, i.e., because He, the All-knowing and All-truthful, has revealed it.
II. Revelation is divided also, according to its substance, into natural and supernatural.
(a) Revelation is natural in substance if it extends only to such truths as are expressed in creation and are, consequently, knowable from nature. God can also, by a positive revelation, communicate to man what man of himself could learn from the contemplation of nature, just as one man can impart to another by words what the latter might find out, or may have already found out, by reflection. Those truths which man can know from the consideration of created nature, by the mere light of reason, constitute the subject-matter of natural religion; and thus divine revelation, if it only communicated such truths, though supernatural in form, would be natural in substance.
Truths which may be inferred from nature, or discovered by the mere light of reason, are called natural truths. These natural truths, which are matter of
knowledge inasmuch as they are known by the contemplation of nature, become matter of faith when they are communicated by the word of God. Since faith is the submission
of the intellect to the authority of God, it follows that the revelation also of natural truths is salutary, and, therefore, suited to the nature of man,
affording him opportunity of submitting his understanding to God’s sovereign truthfulness. Hence the Vatican Council (de fide II, can. 2) defines:
If anyone assert that it is impossible or unbecoming that man should be taught by divine revelation concerning God and the homage to be paid to Him; let him be anathema.
(b) Revelation is supernatural in substance when it embraces truths which are not expressed in creation and, consequently, cannot be known from nature, or by unaided reason. If there are truths which God has not manifested through creation, He is as free to reveal them as He is to reveal those which man could find out by his own reasoning. And if these truths should contain mysteries, man, indeed, will not compass their intrinsic nature; he will not, for instance, understand why in God there should be three Persons, or how there can be three Persons in one substance; but he will understand the meaning of the proposition: In God there are three Persons. A man can understand the meaning of a geometrical proposition without understanding its intrinsic nature and its proof.
The very fact that God is infinite makes it probable that there are truths which He has not manifested through the creation of the universe.
The deist, therefore, irrationally denies that there are truths in God which can be known only by revelation. At least he must admit that in God there are free acts of the will,
of which man has no knowledge; for who can say that he knows all the free acts of another's will? What reason teaches us as at least probable, namely,
that God's infinite being contains truths which man of himself could never know, revelation, as manifesting such truths, proves to be a fact.
Hence the canon of the Vatican Council (de fide II, can. 7): If anyone assert that man cannot be raised by God to a knowledge and perfection surpassing nature,
but that he can and must of himself, by continual progress, finally arrive at the possession of all truth and goodness; let him be anathema.
B. To gain a suitable knowledge of the natural truths of religion, a supernatural revelation was morally necessary for the human race.
In order to disprove the existence of a revelation, rationalism asserts that man is self-sufficient, and, therefore, needs no revelation. But, granting that man by the aid of reason could easily and infallibly arrive at the knowledge of natural truths, the conclusion that there is no revelation would be false; for, in the first place, there is this advantage in revelation, that by believing it man will have an opportunity of submitting his understanding and his will to God, and thus rendering Him homage. For, if man believes a revealed truth, he accepts it, not because he understands it, but simply because God, the Sovereign Truth, has revealed it; and thus he humbly submits his understanding to G0d’s word. Secondly, God may have decreed to require of man the knowledge of truths, and the fulfilment of duties, which can be known only by revelation. In this case, faith on the part of man, as well as revelation on the part of God, is indispensable. For the present, however, we are concerned only with the supernatural revelation of those truths which belong to the natural order.
We call that morally necessary which cannot without great difficulty be dispensed with, or that which as a means to a certain end is so necessary that without it the latter can hardly, or only imperfectly, be attained. A supernatural revelation is, therefore, morally necessary to man if without such revelation he could only with great difficulty attain to a moderately developed knowledge of the natural truths of religion, or if without it these truths could be but imperfectly known. Now, without the aid of revelation, or of some other extraordinary means – for instance, a special divine providence in regard to each individual – mankind would inevitably be in such a predicament, as the present state of man and experience itself amply testify.
I. Were it even established as certain that man, endowed as he is with reason, possesses of himself the ability by his own efforts to attain to a moderate knowledge of God and of the truths of natural religion, yet without revelation – (a) only a few would gain a sufficiently developed knowledge of God and of those truths. To many, the weakness of their intellectual powers would be an obstacle, rendering them unfit to investigate the truth. Others would be hindered from serious reflection upon religious questions by worldly occupations; others, again, by their natural indolence would shrink from the difficulties of an inquiry into a matter so abstruse. (b) Those who would not have to contend against such difficulties could only hope to attain to a sufficient knowledge of religion at a late stage of life; for the amount of preparatory knowledge necessary, and the difficulty of so many of the questions relating to God and things divine, and particularly the fickleness of youth, would render impossible an early acquaintance with those truths which, especially in youth, ought to control all our actions. (c) The few who might finally seem to have reached the goal of their inquiry would with some truths have gathered many errors, as the researches of pagan philosophers amply prove. These errors, which could not long remain undiscovered, would necessarily produce doubt and uncertainty regarding the rest of their knowledge; and thus certainty, which alone can satisfy the mind and sustain the will under all difficulties, would be wanting. The contradictions which would exist among inquirers would weaken the confidence of the uneducated masses and render it impossible to impart to them even those truths which might otherwise be taught with certainty.
II. If we consult experience, it will afford us numberless proofs of this fact. Although we find some sort of knowledge of God and of the natural truths of religion even with the most barbarous nations, who have abandoned the light of revelation, yet with none of them is such a knowledge to be found in a developed state or without being disfigured by the grossest errors. Even among the most learned philosophers we meet with the greatest uncertainty on questions of natural religion, as soon as they ignore the vestiges of divine revelation preserved by the human race, and, trusting to reason alone, seek the solution of religious problems. Side by side with excellent maxims regarding virtue, we find with some philosophers principles which make light of justice and morality, to say nothing of the fact that many of them, like Socrates and Cato the Censor, dishonored themselves by gross immorality, and thus forfeited all their influence in the religious and moral education of the people. Not the philosophers, however, but the poets, were the chief teachers of the people in matters of religion. And certainly the fact that these represented the gods as addicted to the grossest vices, and thus set them up as examples of immorality to the people, could not but produce the most baneful effects. Hence we need not be surprised if even with the most cultured nations of antiquity human sacrifices and immoral practices were considered as essential parts of religious worship.
From a fact so universal we may well conclude that without revelation a sufficient knowledge of the natural truths of religion is extremely difficult,
i.e., morally impossible, and, therefore, that revelation is morally necessary. The philosophers themselves confessed at times their inability to give the people
any adequate directions towards the worship of God, and therefore referred them to the oracles, not to the philosophers, or consoled them with the prospect of
one to come, who would teach how to behave towards the gods and men
(Plato, Alcibiad. II). They were also convinced that truth had been better known
in past ages, when man was nearer to the primitive source of revelation.
From this moral necessity we cannot, however, conclude that God was bound to reveal Himself to man, and that a revelation had, consequently, taken place. God might have left man without a positive revelation, depending solely on his reason and free will, by the right use of which he could, though with difficulty, have attained to his natural end, if such only had been proposed for him by the Creator. And, although we are not inclined to think that God would have created man in the helpless state in which we now behold him, yet we see no obligation on the part of God to rescue man from such a state, in case he thrust himself into it by his own doing. Now, revelation teaches us that by the sin of our first parent the whole human race fell; history shows that in the course of time mankind sank deeper by its own fault. Man's moral helplessness, however, is such that reason inclines us to the belief that God in His goodness has devised some plan of succor in his behalf.
C. In the supposition of a supernatural order, a revelation supernatural in form and substance was absolutely necessary to man for the attainment of his end.
I. If man was destined for supernatural bliss, consisting in beholding God face to face, and if he is to reach that end in a manner suitable to his rational nature, he must, first of all, know that end. For a rational being gains his end only by the effort of his will; but he can only will that which he knows. Therefore man must know and worship God not merely as the Creator of the natural order and the giver of a natural happiness, but also as the Creator of the supernatural order and the author of a supernatural happiness. But a religion which proposes to man a supernatural reward is supernatural in substance.
The Prophet Isaias.
Now such supernatural truths can only be known by supernatural revelation. For, in this life, reason knows God only as He manifests Himself in His external works, and especially in the faculties of the human soul and through the voice of conscience (Rom. 1: 20). Now, human nature, it is true, by its longing for happiness, proclaims that man is destined for a beatitude which is only to be found in God; but it does not reveal that this bliss is to consist in the contemplation of God's essence. Consequently this end, which exceeds all human exigence and capacity, cannot be learned from nature, but only from revelation. The same applies to other dispensations and precepts depending on God's free choice, by which man is to be guided to that supernatural end.
II. Hence it follows that if man, as is actually the case, is destined for a supernatural happiness, and is to gain it by free effort,
a revelation supernatural in form and substance was necessary. Therefore the Vatican Council (de fide c. 2) teaches that revelation was necessary
because God in His infinite goodness has destined man for a supernatural end, namely, for the possession of celestial goods, which surpass the knowledge of the human mind.
D. Man has the strict obligation of accepting a supernatural revelation, if vouchsafed to him, and recognized by him as divine.
The obligation of inquiring into the divinity of a revelation exists only for those who are not yet convinced of its divine character. But he who lives in the light of revelation knows its divinity, and can never have rational grounds for a time to discontinue his belief in order to inquire into the divine origin of revelation. For its credibility is proved by such convincing arguments, and grace so strongly urges him to unswerving faith, that every doubt of revelation once accepted is unwarranted. We are free, however, and it is even advisable, to examine the grounds upon which the credibility of revelation rests.
The obligation of accepting a revelation which is proved to be divine follows from the very nature of revelation.
I. If we consider revelation in its form, it is the word of God; for it is God who speaks to mankind by His messengers. Why does God speak to us? Doubtless, that we may believe Him. It is with this intent that one man communicates his thought to another, as the object of speech in general is the mutual interchange of thought. If a man cannot be indifferent whether we believe his words or not, whether or not his knowledge and truthfulness be called into question, much less can God be indifferent. For in virtue of His holiness He must exact, on the one hand, that men honor Him by acknowledging His omniscience and truthfulness, and, on the other hand, that he submit to Him by accepting His words.
II. The subject-matter of revelation comprises also the manner in which God wishes to be known, honored, and worshipped. In this consists religion in its objective sense. Now, it certainly depends upon God to determine how He is to be honored. Even the mighty of this earth prescribe the manner in which they would be served by their subjects.
III. Though the supreme object of revelation is the glory of God, yet its proximate end is the happiness of man. Now, as God is free to determine the manner in which He wishes to be honored, so He is likewise free to predestine man for a supernatural end, and to make its attainment dependent on certain conditions. And as it is the duty of man to honor God in the manner determined by Him, so is it his duty also to endeavor to attain that end, and to fulfill those conditions put by God for its attainment. For the very reason that God has made man's sole end a supernatural one, man is not free to reject a supernatural revelation. It is only by firm faith in revelation that he is enabled to gain his end, and, consequently, he cannot dispense with its light.
If there is such a thing as revelation, deism, which pretends to be satisfied with a natural religion based upon a natural knowledge of God, stands condemned; as also indifferentism, which holds the form of religion to be a matter of indifference, and every religion to be equally good.
E. The knowledge of divine revelation is possible to man.
If it is God's will that man should accept a revelation, He must invest it with certain marks by which it may be certainly recognized as divine, and by which it may be distinguished from a pretended revelation.
I. Considered in its object, revelation is the way which is to lead man to his last end. This intention of God, however, cannot be realized unless man is able clearly to discern the way pointed out to him by God, and to distinguish it from any false paths he may encounter.
II. Considered in its substance, revelation is the manner in which God wishes to be honored and served. God as the All-wise requires a reasonable service (Rom. 12: 1). But we would not offer a reasonable service if caprice, not well-grounded conviction, prompted our belief in revelation.
III. Considered in its form, revelation is the voice of God, and as such claims faith, i.e., an unwavering belief resting on the authority of God. Without previous certainty, however, our faith in revelation is infirm. For it is unreasonable to accept a truth as the utterance of God so long as there can be any just cause to doubt whether or not God has really spoken.
Groundless doubts as to the existence of revelation do not impair the firmness of faith, but are simply to be disregarded, since no reasonable man allows himself to be influenced by such in his ordinary actions. A conviction which rests upon such cogent arguments that only groundless and unreasonable doubts can be raised against it we call moral certainty. A conviction which rests upon such evident reasons that it cannot give room even to unreasonable doubts is called a metaphysical certainty. Only a moral certainty of the existence of revelation is required for faith, i.e., for a firm belief of a revealed truth on the authority of God. For such certainty directs man in the most important affairs of life, and suffices to enable us firmly to grasp the motive of faith, that is, the authority of God upon which rests our belief.
Although such arguments as make the existence of revelation only probable do not suffice of themselves, yet they may be added to others which produce moral certainty, as they aid us to overcome possible doubts with greater facility and to submit with greater promptness.
The Sermon on the Mount.
F. There are distinctive marks by which a true revelation may be recognized.
I. The marks of revelation, i.e., those signs by which we may judge whether a revelation is genuine or spurious are: (a) positive or negative, (b) internal or external.
By positive marks we may judge with greater or less certainty that revelation which pretends to be divine is really such; by negative marks we conclude that it is not such. Internal marks are those which are taken from the substance of revelation itself, to prove or disprove its divine origin. From the revelation itself which is announced as divine we may conclude the bringer is a messenger of God or not. External marks are those taken from the conduct of him who professes to be a divine messenger and the bringer of a revelation.
(a) Among the internal marks of revelation the negative have the greatest weight. A pretended revelation, the substance of which includes anything contrary to reason, or to the laws of morality, cannot possibly be genuine. For God is not the author of falsehood and cannot lead man to anything unholy. By this mark alone many pretended revelations of paganism, sanctioning polytheism and other immoral tenets are refuted.
In like manner, every pretended revelation which contradicts a divinely approved revelation (e.g. Christianity) is necessarily false; since God cannot contradict His own former statements.
It does not follow, however, that in order to assure ourselves of the genuineness or spuriousness of a revelation we are bound to test each point of doctrine separately. (i) Such a test is not suited to every revelation; since among revealed doctrines there may be mysteries, which, not being accessible to human reason, may contain truths apparently contradictory. (ii) Nor is it suited to the capacity of most persons, who, even in natural truths, are unable to judge of the presence or absence of a contradiction. (iii) Such a test is, furthermore, needless; for once the fact of revelation is established, its substance cannot possibly contain anything contrary to reason; all apparent contradictions will vanish upon closer examination.
If the substance of a revelation is noble, holy, and in keeping with the higher aspirations of man, this fact is a very probable positive mark of its divine origin. The divinity of such a revelation remains probable only so long as it is not manifest that those doctrines have not been discovered by human reason or drawn from other sources. Even pagan philosophers have known many sublime truths relating to God; and Mohammed borrowed several of his doctrines from the Mosaic and Christian revelations.
Internal positive marks are not calculated, under all circumstances, to be a convincing proof of the divinity of a revelation. For, (i) not every doctrine can be compassed in its intrinsic nature and sublimity, and the bulk of mankind is unable to examine the truth, sublimity, and fitness of doctrines. (ii) It is only after a man believes, often only when he takes pain to regulate his life in harmony with them, that he discovers that certain doctrines satisfy the cravings of his heart. (iii) Again, there may be times of hard trial, when coldness and insensibility take the place of spiritual consolation. (iv) Besides, the interior, spiritual life is easily subject to illusions; and fanatics may sometimes feel apparent satisfaction in their absurd opinion.
(b) If by external marks one is proved to be a messenger of God, we have thereby a guarantee for the truth of all he announces in this capacity. A person, then, is proved by external signs to be God's envoy if his assertion that he is such is substantiated by divine testimony, sanctioned by God's signature and seal (miracles and prophecies). While, therefore, we may conclude a divine mission from internal evidence taken from the substance of revelation, we may, on the other hand, infer the divinity of a revelation from the divine mission of him who announces it.
Hence the Vatican Council (de fide III, can. 7) decrees: If anyone assert that divine revelation cannot be made credible by external signs, and,
therefore, that men must be moved to faith only by the inward experience, or by the private inspiration of each individual; let him be anathema.
II. The most effectual way to assure one's self of the divinity of a revelation is to examine the divine mission of the bringer by means of external marks.
(a) It is the easiest way; for external facts are more easily known than the internal truth of most dogmas, particularly when the facts attending the divine revelation
appear in the clearest light. (b) It attains its object in the shortest time, whilst the life of man would scarcely suffice to examine in detail even those truths
which are accessible to reason. (c) It is the safest way and, in every case, the most convincing. For, while the knowledge of the internal truth of dogmas and of
the fitness of certain institutions is often beyond our reach; and while, even in case such knowledge were attained, a reasonable doubt might still remain whether the
doctrine in question might not be the product of human reason – as soon as the fact of a divine mission is established, all doubt as to the truth and origin of the doctrine
ceases; since a divine messenger, as such, can announce only divine truth. Therefore the Vatican Council (de fide c. 3) teaches that miracles and prophecies,
because they clearly show forth God’s omnipotence and omniscience, are absolutely signs of divine revelation, and suited to the capacity of all.
The total absence of external signs is a proof that he who professes to be a messenger of God and to announce a divine revelation is not such in reality. For, if God must make revelation knowable in order that it may be reasonably and firmly believed, and if external signs are the only adequate means for that end, we must conclude that, if signs are wanting, God did not intend the belief of the doctrine in question, and, consequently, that He did not reveal it. Since God always suits the means to the end, it is certain that if He allows the means necessary to an end to be wanting, He does not intend the end itself. This, however, applies only to a new revelation not yet proved by previous divine facts. The teacher of a doctrine already established as divine can justly appeal to those previous miraculous facts on which its credibility rests.
The Miracle of Elias.
G. Miracles and prophecies are sure evidences of the divinity of a revelation.
(i) By miracles we mean such extraordinary works as cannot be accomplished by natural forces, but only by God's omnipotence: e.g., the instantaneous and complete cure of a sick person, the raising of a dead man to life. God, no doubt, can, in virtue of His omnipotence, whenever His wise designs demand it, change the nature of created things, increase and diminish their forces, govern them by other laws, substitute for these forces His own divine power, or produce in nature such effects as no created power can produce. Or are nature's laws more powerful than He who framed them? Should He who has power to create not be able to restore lost health or even departed life? Is He not free for a moment to withhold His cooperation from created causes to prevent them from exerting their power?
God alone can work miracles, since He alone is Lord of all nature. He alone is the ultimate cause of things, and, consequently, His will is the last cause of their being and their laws. God may use finite beings as means to produce miracles, but these are not the authors, but only the instruments, of miracles.
From the knowledge that we possess of many of the laws of nature it follows that, in many cases, miracles are knowable as such. We know, for instance, with certainty that a stone thrown in the air must fall to the ground. Though we are not conversant with all nature’s laws, yet we know many of them, and, consequently, we discern what is in harmony with, and what is in opposition to them. If God can work miracles; if, as the Lord of the universe, He wishes to speak to us through miracles, He can also so dispose circumstances, and so influence our mind, that in many cases we may know with certainty that a miracle has taken place. However the power of evil spirits may be hidden from us, yet we must concede that God has the means of convincing us that He, and not His enemy, speaks to us through any unusual occurrence. For the rest, the enemy of God, who only devises evil, though for a time he may conceal his designs, will sooner or later betray himself.
(ii) Prophecies are predictions based upon a certain knowledge of future events, which cannot be, or at least were not, foreseen from natural causes. God alone knows the whole future; for He alone comprehends all that is knowable, while man can only know those future events which may be foreseen in their causes. The free actions of man cannot, by reason of their freedom, be predicted with certainty by a finite being; since one act of the will does not follow upon another as in nature one movement is the result of another. Nor can the evil spirits foresee free actions with certainty, although they may perhaps, from natural causes unknown to us, surmise much that we cannot foresee, and foretell their own future actions.
As, in many cases, a fact may be known as a miracle, so also a prediction may be known as a true prophecy, as often as it can be established, on the one hand, that the event foretold is a free action that could not with certainty be foreseen by the human mind; and, on the other hand, the prediction is based on certain knowledge and is not mere conjecture.
The Vatican Council (de fide III, can. 8) issued the following definition regarding the possibility, knowableness, and convincing force of miracles:
If anyone assert that miracles are impossible, and that, consequently, all records of them, though contained in Holy Writ, are to be considered as fables or myths,
or that miracles can never be known with certainty, and that the divine origin of the Christian religion cannot be properly demonstrated by them; let him be anathema.
Miracles and prophecies are certain evidences of those truths in confirmation of which they have taken place, and, consequently, of the divine mission of him who claims to be an envoy of God and bases the divinity of his mission on those supernatural signs which God works through him.
I. God the all-truthful cannot bear witness to a falsehood. But He would bear witness to a falsehood if He worked miracles in favor of an impostor who appealed to such signs as proofs of his divine mission. For a miracle, under such circumstances, would be a divine seal with which God would confirm a false utterance.
II. God the all-holy cannot lead men to believe what is false. Now, He would lead whole nations and races into error if He worked miracles in favor of a false prophet, or conferred on him the gift of miracles. And, in fact, this universal error would, in such a case, proceed from God; for the more prudent and upright a man is, the more he is inclined to put faith in one to whom God has vouchsafed the gift of miracles.
III. God the all-wise cannot renounce the fittest means of communicating His will to man. But the fittest means to this end are miracles and prophecies. For, what other means could take their place? If God appeared in visible form among men, such a form would be an assumed one, and thus the question would again arise, how we are to know that God has assumed this form. If miracles are not sufficient to remove all doubt, there is no means whatever by which God can reveal Himself to us visibly, that is, in a manner suited to our composite nature. Not without reason have men at all times believed a doctrine to be beyond all doubt if it was announced by one who could appeal to miracles in evidence of his mission. God, therefore, would renounce the fittest means of conveying His will to men if He gave a false prophet the gift of miracles in confirmation of his false doctrine. For then there would no longer be any means of distinguishing a true from a false revelation, and, consequently, God could not manifest Himself in an evident manner to His rational creatures.
Though miracles and prophecies can never take place to confirm a false doctrine, yet there is no repugnance in the fact that God should work miracles through sinful men for some other end; for instance, to free His servants from suffering (Matt. 7: 22).
Hence deism is irrational in rejecting revelation on the plea that it cannot be known; while indifferentism is equally absurd in maintaining that the form of religion is a matter of indifference, on the pretense that a true revelation cannot be distinguished from a false one.
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